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Buckley: Three Theories of Substantive Fairness

THREE THEORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE
FAIRNESS
F. H. Buckley*
Progress in legal theory comes through better answers or, less

obviously, better questions. In some cases, the identification of a
pseudo-problem may even be more significant than the solution to a
real problem. What matters in the end are the answers, but these
might be impossible without the prior abandonment of a false start.
Thereafter, it no longer confuses analysis, and is remembered, like
the last Beethoven quartets, as a road that led nowhere.
Most contemporary legal scholars regard questions of substantive fairness in contracts as pseudo-problems. 1 For them, an unconscionable bargain must be procedurally unfair, in the sense that it
was induced through an improper strategy. 2 Once the procedural re* Professor, George Mason School of Law; B.A. McGill University, 1969; LL.B. McGill
Law School, 1974; LL.M. Harvard Law School, 1975. The author thanks Bill Adams, Lloyd
Cohen, Esther Goldberg, Ron Heiner, Bruce Johnsen, Henry Manne, Alvin Roth, David Stevens and participants at workshops at the Canadian Law and Economics Association and at
the School of Law and the Center for Study of Public Choice of George Mason University for
their valuable comments. This Article was begun while the author was a John M. Olin Visiting
Fellow at the University of Chicago Law School. Research assistance from the Scaife Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See, e.g., Epstein, Unconscionability:A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293,
315 (1975) (concluding that the doctrine of substantive unconscionability does "more social
harm than good."). Norms of substantive fairness govern bargaining solutions or outcomes,
however negotiated, while procedural fairness refers to the tactics used to reach an agreement,
without respect to the outcome. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967) (distinguishing between "substantive unconscionability" and "procedural unconscionability"). An unjust price would then be an example
of the first kind of unfairness, and fraud an example of the second. See id. This distinction also
figures importantly in contemporary political philosophy. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTc
85-89 (1971) (contrasting "allocative" and "pure procedural" justice); R. NozICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 150-60 (1975) (distinguishing between "patterned" and "historical" concepts of justice).
2. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 315 (stating that the only reasons invoked for not enforcing a contract are "proof of some defect in the process of contract formation" or some
incompetence of the party against whom the agreement is to be enforced."). The unintelligibility of complaints of substantively unfair terms when a bargain is procedurally fair was a principle theme of Professor Arthur Leff. See Leff, supra note 1, at 516-28, 537-41; see also
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quirements are satisfied, there is no basis for inquiring into the contract's substantive fairness. Thus, courts ought not police procedurally benign bargains to ensure that the payoffs to each party are fair.
This Article seeks to revive interest in substantive fairness
norms on the basis of the efficiencies they serve. A contract is efficient when all opportunities for gains through trade have been exploited. An efficiency defense of substantive fairness norms must
therefore show that the bargainers are more likely to exploit joint
gains when substantively unfair contracts are set aside.
Efficiency theories may be contrasted with distributional explanations of substantive fairness norms. While efficiency refers to the
size of the joint contractual gains, distributional justice concerns the
division of the gains between the parties.' The differences may be
illustrated through a simple model of negotiations between bilateral
monopolists, who can trade on more profitable terms with each other
than with any other party.4 The parties begin by bargaining for an
efficient set of terms, which game theorists call the presolution to the
bargaining problem.5 For example, the contract will assign risks to
Epstein, supra note 1, at 305-15 (examining several contract clauses that can be attacked as
"substantively unconscionable" and describing why they are not unconscionable in and of
themselves). The suppression of substantive norms is not a recent development. Amongst lawyers, procedural norms of fairness began to supplant substantive ones as early as the eighteenth century. See Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587, 1592-1603 (1981)

(describing the abandonment of substantive norms).
3. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 84-90.
4. In a bilateral monopoly, the parties to a bargain are unique, and the contractual
surplus is unavailable when they deal with other parties and not each other. See S. SIEGEL &
L. FOURAKER, BARGAINING AND GROUP DECISION MAKING EXPERIMENTS IN BILATERAL MONOPOLY 1-16 (1960).
5. "Game theory" analyzes human interaction by reference to the strategies available to
participants. M. SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6-7 (1982); see also T.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1980). The presolution or "core" is the set of feasible, Pareto-optimal and individually rational solutions, these terms being defined with reference to the game's Von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function. See J. VON NEUMANN
& 0. MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 240-42 (1944); see also
M. SHUBIK, A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL ECONOMY 254 (1984). The charac-

teristic function of a game is its worth for every coalition of players. The characteristic function v(i) is the value for Player i if he does not enter into a coalition, while v(N) is the value of
the all-party set. A payoff vector (denoted a) will then be feasible if
X ai _ v(N)
and will be Pareto-optimal if it is feasible and
Z ai
v(N)
and will be individually rational if
for all i i N
ai 2_ v(i)
and a presolution if it is all three. Thus, a presolution is feasible when it represents a vector
available through cooperation, Pareto-optimal when it is feasible and further cooperative gains
are impossible for any coalition of players, and individually rational when no player is made
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the party who can bear them at the least cost. When all such gains
have been exploited, they next turn their attention to the purchase

price, which might be any figure between the highest price the buyer
will pay and the lowest price the seller will accept. Each price will
offer the parties a different division of the bargaining gains, and is a

solution to the bargaining problem.
A contract will be efficient if the parties have bargained to the

presolution, and distributionally just if the solution is fair. On this
distinction, the substantive fairness review might appear justified on
distributional and not efficiency theories, since the criterion of fairness is whether contractual gains are divided in an equitable manner.
However, a norm which specifies how bargaining gains should be divided may increase the size of the gains. The imposition of substantive fairness norms may then be defended for the efficiencies they
serve, with distributional justice merely an instrumental concern.
Efficiency explanations of substantive fairness norms are more
persuasive than distributional ones. In competitive markets, the im-

position of bargaining solutions on distributional theories will be selfworse off by joining a coalition than he would be on his own. In the familiar Edgworth Box
function, all points on the contract curve, or the locus of tangencies of indifference curves
within the bargaining lens, are presolutions. See Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange and Auction:
Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 221, 226-42
(1980).
6. Axiomatic solution theories define bargaining gains as the sum of the parties' utility
increases on agreement. See A. ROTH, AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING (Lecture Notes in
Economics and Mathematical Systems No. 170, 1979). This assumes a cardinal rather than an
ordinal measure of utility. Cardinality means that solutions are invariant under positive, linear
transformations of the form
V(A) = aU(A) + b,

a > 0

where a and b are constants. See M. SHUBIK, supra note 5, at 92. By contrast, ordinal functions merely permit monotone, order-preserving transformations of the kind
V(A) = F(U(A))

where U is an ordinal utility function which is mapped onto V in such a way that
V(x) > V(y) if and only if U(x) > U(y). Id. Within these bounds, V may take any value,
such as U 3 or nY. Ordinal functions offer an unsatisfactory foundation for bargaining solutions, since a solution for one game may be transformed into a different vector for the identical
game by permissible techniques of manipulation. See id. at 92-95 (describing the "bargainers'
paradox").
Transformation-invariance must be distinguished from interpersonal comparability. Under
bargaining theories, each party decides whether to claim or concede an outcome solely by
reference to his own utility level. See J. HARSANYI, RATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND BARGAINING
EQUILIBRIUM IN GAMES AND SOCIAL SITUATIONS 13-15, 191-93 (1977). Since he need not

know the other party's utility, interpersonal utility comparisons are unnecessary. Id. However,
under arbitrationtheories, a solution is determined by a third party arbitrator, who must know
both parties' utility levels. Id. Because they require a judgment made by an arbitrator, normative solution theories assume both cardinality and interpersonal comparability. Id.
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defeating. For instance, a substantive fairness review of one part of
the bargain, say the price, will be futile if sellers may respond by7
changing another part of the bargain, like the quality of the goods.
Thus, the imposition of a just price might simply drive out high
quality goods from the market. The identification of a special class
of consumers as deserving of greater judicial protection will also increase the seller's cost of dealing with them. Sellers will raise the
price charged them or refuse entirely to deal with them."Moreover,
if contracts in competitive markets are subjected to a substantive
fairness review, market transactions might be impeached by any
party with a slender share of the consumer's surplus.
On distributional theories, substantive fairness norms are no
more attractive in bilateral monopolies than in competitive markets.
Suppose, for example, that two parties bargain in ignorance of market prices and agree on an outcome which allocates nearly all of the
contractual surplus to one of them. After the bargain is made, the
parties discover that a competitive market exists for the goods and
that they have fortuitously settled upon the market price. Now, if
the price was unfair before the veil of ignorance was lifted, it remains unfair thereafter. Similarly, if market price is upheld, so too
will the identical price arrived at by the bilateral monopolists. Moral
neutrality in the derivation of market price disinfects the apparently
unfair price in the bilateral monopoly.
The imposition of substantive fairness norms might then be defended for the incentive, cooperation or screening efficencies which
they serve. Incentive explanations, considered in Part I,' are suggested by Landes and Posner for contracts of rescue,10 and may also
explain the prohibition of blackmail. Part II examines cooperation
theories, under which the fairness review by a court increases the
level of contracting." More bargains will be made where unfair ones
are not enforced. Screening efficiencies are discussed in Part III, and
7. See Cayne & Trebilcock, Market Considerationsin the Formulation of Consumer
ProtectionPolicy, 23 U. TORONTo LJ. 396, 407-08 (1973) (stating that consumer protection

legislation is "exclusionary" where sellers respond by reducing quality, increasing price, or
withdrawing from the market).

8. As Professor Leff observed, "the benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether
geographically or legally." Leff, supra note 1, at 557.
9. See infra notes 13-58 and accompanying text.
10. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans,and Other Rescuers: An
Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 83 (1978) [hereinafter Landes &
Posner, Salvors].
11. See infra notes 59-103 and accompanying text.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol19/iss1/2

4

Buckley: Three Theories of Substantive Fairness

1990]

SUBSTANTIVE FAIRNESS

may arise when one party's costs of reviewing the terms of the agree-2
ment are reduced by judicial review of its substantive fairness.1
While there are few cases where a contract might be set aside under
any one of these theories, the threat of unenforcibility may usefully
deter overreaching by bargainers.
I. INCENTIVE THEORIES

Substantive fairness norms serve incentive efficiencies where the
parties react to the possibility of a one-sided contract by taking excessive pre-bargain care. Both parties may take precautions to increase or lessen the probability of the unfair contract. The potential
"winners" will seek to increase the probability of gains through the
contract. For example, a blackmailer may invest in the production of
information concerning his victim's vices. For their part, the potential "losers" will wish to minimize the likelihood of finding themselves obliged to enter into the contract. Thus, rescue victims may
take precautions to ensure that they will not need a rescue.
Precaution costs are socially wasteful when the costs of the precautions exceed their gains. In such cases, the appropriate legal response may be to reduce incentives to take precautions. One method
of doing so is to subject contracts formed under a great disparity in
bargaining leverage to a substantive fairness review. Winners will
then have less to gain from the contract, and losers less to lose. In
this way, the doctrine of duress in contract law might serve incentive
efficiencies.
A. Antiduress Rules
A contract made under duress is voidable by the victim if the
threat left him with no reasonable alternative, but to enter into the
contract.' 3 Before the remedy is available, however, something more
than practical compulsion must be shown. Even if the victim has no
practical alternative but to submit, the contract will be enforced if
the threat is permissible. 4 The distinction between permissible and
12. See infra notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
13. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

175(1) (1981)

[hereinafter

RESTATEMENT].

14. See Id. § 175 comment a (1981). Even in such cases, the distinction cannot be extracted from the principle of consent. The highwayman's "Your money or your life" does leave
the victim with a choice between two alternatives, albeit unpleasant ones. As Justice Holmes
remarked, "[i]t always is for the interest of a party under duress to choose the lesser of two
evils. But the fact that a choice was made according to interest does not exclude duress."

Union Pacific Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918). Indeed, the stronger the
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impermissible threats is fundamental to an understanding of duress.

A threat is impermissible under the doctrine of legal duress if

performance of the threatened act would be a crime or tort. 15 Barri-

ers to legal duress are justified on incentive theories, since victims
would react to the threat by taking excessive precautions. But victims might also take excessive care where the threatened action is
not wrongful. The threat may still be irresistible and victims may
still seek to minimize the likelihood of its occurrence. Because such
care may be excessive, a threat may be impermissible under the docduress even if the threatened action is
trine of economic
1
6
permissible.
Not every threat will ground a claim of economic duress. Otherwise, the doctrine would be impossibly broad. For example, a seller's
assertion of a right to withdraw from negotiations is a threat of noncontracting. 17 Were it to constitute economic duress, property owners
would be required to sell their goods to anyone who offered a derisory price for them. Since this would dissolve property rights, a distinction must be made between permissible threats and economic duress. In the case of blackmail and rescue contracts, the distinction is
most plausibly made on incentive theories.

B. Blackmail
Blackmail is a prominent example of economic duress. 18 The
threat, the stronger the consent may be, for the victim will weigh the alternatives far more
carefully in such cases than on a more mundane choice. See Dalzell, Duress by Economic
PressureI, 20 N.C.L. REv. 237, 238 (1942) (describing the choice of one who pays ransom to
a kidnapper as "an expression of the most genuine, heartfelt consent").
15. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, § 176(l)(a) (defining when a threat is improper).
If such threats were permitted, victims might be led to take excessive care against them. In
addition, granting a remedy when a contract is induced by such a threat might lower the level
of illegality. The maker of a threat may find himself compelled to acquire the reputation of
one who might carry it out by committing illegal acts. Were the resulting contracts enforceable, the increase in threats might be accompanied by an increase in illegal acts. Threats may
also be carried out if negotiations between the parties break down. See infra notes 18-23 and
accompanying text.
16. As Holmes noted, "it does not follow that, because you cannot be made to answer
for the act, you may use the threat." Silsbee v. Webber, 171 Mass. 378, 381, 50 N.E. 555, 556
(1898) (setting aside a contract which was induced by a threat to tell the victim's husband
that their son was an embezzler); see Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure 11, 20 N.C.L.
REv. 341, 361-86 (1942).
17.

See Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 701

n.164 (1984).
18. Since blackmail is a crime as well as a defense to an action in contract, the threat
resembles legal duress. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4(3) (1980) (discussing theft by
extortion). However, blackmail constitutes economic duress since the threat is one to perform
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blackmailer's threat to reveal confidential information permits him
to extract a fee from his victim in exchange for his silence. The possibility of an extortionate bargain will lead both blackmailer and victim to incur precaution costs. Blackmailers will seek out information
about their victims, who in turn will either reduce their level of deviant behavior or attempt to keep it confidential.1 9 If these precaution
costs are excessive, blackmail would stand condemned on incentive
theories.
The precaution costs of blackmail may not be excessive if such
contracts are socially beneficial. The information which the victim
seeks to keep confidential will usually concern his deviance from social norms.2 0 If these norms are valuable, 21 an argument might be
made for enforcing blackmail contracts. Enforcement would give
blackmailers a greater incentive to ferret out damaging information
about their victims. With a greater probability of blackmail, the
costs of deviance will increase and its level will decline. In this way,
blackmail may usefully enforce social norms.
On the other hand, blackmail should be suppressed if the norms
it enforces are vicious. Not all social norms are benign, and some
may be rooted in feelings of envy or prejudice. For other sins, the
value of the norm may be slight compared to the humiliation deviants experience on exposure. In such cases, blackmail may over-deter
by exacting an excessive compliance with the norms.2 2
an act which itself is permitted. See Lindgren, supra note 17, at 670-71. Where truth is a
defense to an action for libel, the blackmailer could not be prosecuted if he released the information to the public without attempting to profit from it. See Id. at 680-717 (reviewing the
explanations for the prohibition of blackmail).
19. Where vices may be safely practiced in secret, the victim pays only the tribute of
hypocrisy which virtue extracts from vice. In most cases, however, the transgressors will face a
possibility of either public exposure or blackmail.
20. See Coase, Blackmail, 74 VA. L. Rav. 655, 657-58 (1988).
21. Social norms are frequently backed by legal sanctions on breach, and in such cases
the utility of the norm must be conceded. But even purely social norms may be valuable. In
such cases, the absence of a criminal sanction might reflect the possibility of overdeterence
rather than the disutility of the norm.
22. The likelihood of overdeterrence increases when victims might pay the blackmailer
an amount which exceeds the value to the victim of silence. See Coase, supra note 20, at 671.
There is always a possibility that the blackmailer will return to his victim for a second fee,
even where he has promised not to. See id. at 674-75. In such cases, the first payment is a
sunk cost, and will not be considered by the victim in deciding whether to pay the second fee.
See Shubik, The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradoxin Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation, 15 J. CONFLIcT RESOLUTION 109 (1971) (describing a game in which competitive bidders
may offer more than $1.00 for a dollar bill if prior bids are sunk costs).
The private enforcement of morals might also be troubling because of the possibility of
blackmailer misbehavior. Where moral bounty-hunting through blackmail is permitted, fraud
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Blackmail should also be suppressed if the underlying social
norms are neither good nor bad, since it will lead both parties to
incur excessive precaution costs. All costs borne by victims in an attempt to cover up their deviance will be wasteful if compliance with
the norms is morally neutral. In addition, all costs incurred by blackmailers in producing information about victims represents a deadweight efficiency loss if the information serves no economic purpose.28 In such cases, incentive theories would justify the imposition
of substantive fairness norms. If the blackmailer is required to return
his fee, his incentive to produce the information will disappear. However, the remedy of rescission will not assist victims. They will find
the cure no better than the disease, for pursuing the remedy will
require them to reveal the secret information. Since victims will not
sue, blackmailers will not be deterred. This explains why blackmail
is not merely a civil wrong but also a crime. Even if the information
is revealed in a criminal prosecution, the severity of the criminal
sanction is likely to deter the blackmailer.
Contracts of Rescue
24
Rescue contracts are a striking example of economic duress.
As in contracts of blackmail, both winners and losers may take precautions in anticipation of a contract of rescue. The rescuer will seek
to increase the likelihood of a rescue, while the victim seeks to reC.

and entrapment might be commonplace. Once again, this process might lead victims to the
path of excessive virtue.
Less plausibly, blackmail may be thought to underdeter. Victims will value the blackmailer's silence more than the price paid to obtain it. If their incentive to be virtuous is inadequate unless they know that their sins will be revealed, blackmail might not offer adequate
deterrence. See Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42
(1975). However, this is not an argument to require blackmailers to disclose the information,
since they would have no incentive to acquire it under such a duty. Imposing a disclosure duty
would result in weaker, not stronger, deterrence.
23. See D. Ginsburg, Blackmail: An Economic Analysis of the Law 18 (Nov. 4, 1979)
(unpublished manuscript on file at Hofstra Law Review) (stating that "[n]o rational economic
planner would tolerate the existence of an industry dedicated to digging up dirt, at real resource cost, and then reburying it"). Lindgren objects that this analysis will not justify the
prohibition of blackmail when the information is fortuitously obtained. See Lindgren, supra
note 17, at 689-91. But see Coase, supra note 20, at 674 (stating that "it is difficult for me to
believe that, were blackmail made legal, such accidental sightings would not occur more
frequently").
24. "Rescue" is defined as "all attempts to save a person or his property." Landes &
Posner, supra note 10, at 83. Rescue services are "contracted for only in the event that a
hazard occurs and that payment for them is contingent on a successful rescue." Id. at 86.
Therefore, the rescuer has great bargaining leverage over the victim who might have no other
choice but to accept the rescue. Id. at 91.
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duce the likelihood of accident.2 5 When these precautions are excessive,26 the imposition of substantive fairness norms might be justified
on incentive theories, though on a narrower basis than that proposed
by Landes and Posner.27
Incentive explanations regard the victim's need for a rescue as
an accident, against which both parties might take care. 28 The opti-

mal duress rule is thus one which minimizes the accident's social
costs. 29 These costs include each party's costs of harm avoidance as

well as the loss incurred if the rescue fails.30
The following bargain illustrates how the social costs of an accident may arise.
The Starving Millionaire.-Anthony is an adventurous millionaire,

whose travels have taken him to a remote desert. There his car
breaks down, and he finds himself alone and very hungry. After a
few days of wandering on foot, he comes across Conrad, a mercenary innkeeper. After questioning Anthony about his wealth, Conrad agrees to give Anthony food and lodging, and to help him return to civilization. In return, he demands all of Anthony's wealth.
"Think about it for a few days," he tells Anthony.
Victims such as Anthony may react to the possibility of an oppresive contract by incurring harm avoidance costs E(x). These costs
may result from special precautions taken before visiting remote
places, and from the pleasures foregone when still more dangerous
places are not visited. The harm avoidance costs of rescuers include
both the actual costs of the rescue R, and of pre-rescue care E(y). In
The Starving Millionaire, for example, R represents the cost of the
food given to Anthony, and E(y) the costs of opening and maintaining an inn in the desert to the extent that it was built and operated
to take advantage of gains from rescues. The social costs of the accident will also include the loss L which arises when victims are not
rescued. The expected value of such losses will depend on pv, the

probability that the victim will require a rescue, as well as (1-P), the
25.

Id. at 86.

26. For instance, if the cost of an accident is five dollars, but the cost of prevention is ten
dollars, it is more efficient to forego the preventive actions. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.9, at 175 n.2 (3d ed. 1986).
27. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 100-05.
28. Id. at 83-100.
29. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 54-82 (1987)
(discussing efficient care rules in accident law); see also S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 36-40 (1987) (evaluating efficient care levels for "bilateral" accidents).
30. W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 29, at 58-62.
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1

= the care level of the victim.

Pv(x) = the probability of an accident given x;
PI(x) > 0; P < 0; and Px > 0.

For the rescuers, let
y
= the pre-rescue care level of the rescuer.
P'(y) = the probability of a successful rescue given
y,
32
conditional upon an accident occurring;
PI(y) > 0; P > 0; and P~y < 0.
Increases in y will thus increase the probability of a rescue, but at a
declining rate.
An efficient legal regime will seek to minimize the social cost of
the accident
C(x,y) = p(1-i)L + iPffR + E(x) + E(y)
(1)
Minimizing C with respect to x and y yields
Ex = -P.[(1-P)L + PR]
Ey = PyPV(L - R)

(2)
(3)

where Ex and Ey are the marginal costs of pre-rescue care for victim
and rescuer, respectively.33 In equations (2) and (3), these costs are
seen to equal the marginal benefits of harm reduction. Let x* and y*
be the socially optimal values of x and y which satisfy (2) and (3),
and assume that these are unique. If costlessly enforced, anti-duress
rules will then be efficient to the extent that they lead the parties to
invest these amounts in harm prevention..
Anti-duress rules may then lead the parties to take efficient prerescue care. If y* = 0,34 the social cost of the accident is
31. In the following example, P1 and P' are assumed to be continuously differentiable
functions of care inputs by victims and rescuers, respectively.
32. When the variables x and y are independent, the conditional probability of y, given
x, is equal to the probability of y. See J. KMENTA, ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 48, 58 (2d ed.
1986).
33. To minimize the function C(x,y), the partial derivatives, C. and CY, are set to zero.
See id. at 178-79. Further, it is assumed that Cxx > 0 and Cyy > 0, ensuring that the values
which satisfy (2) and (3) are local minimas and not maximas. See A. CHIANG, FUNDAMENTAL
METHODS OF MATHEMATICAL EcoNoMIcs 315-18 (3d. ed. 1984). The second order condition
C CY- C2, > 0 may be violated where care levels for victim and rescuer are substitutes and
it is not optimal for both to take care.
34. Even though y* = 0 (pre-rescue care is efficient), it is assumed that P > 0, with
rescuers fortuitously happening upon victims.
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C(x) = PV[(l-P')L + PR] + E(x)
and the uniquely optimal duress rule will permit rescuers to recover
R and no more than R. To see that this is optimal, note that rescuers
have adequate incentives to carry out a rescue if given R,35 and that
victims will then select x according to (2). To see that any other
division of the bargaining surplus"6 would be inefficient, note first
that giving rescuers less than R will lead them to abandon all rescues. Moreover, giving rescuers more than R will lead victims to
take excessive care.37 If rescuers are permitted to extract the entire
bargining surplus,3 8 the victim loses L whether or not he is rescued,
and will set
Ex = -PxL

(4)

On comparing (4) with (2), it is seen that in such a case victims will
take excessive care.39 Since victims will never agree to pay for a rescue if R > L, it can be expected that x > x* if rescues are possible.
Landes and Posner have argued that substantive fairness norms
may efficiently be imposed in every rescue bargain. ° Where y* > 0,
however, the parties cannot be induced to make efficient harm prevention decisions solely through the application of substantive fairness norms. To establish this impossibility theorem, suppose first that
rescuers are not permitted to bargain for any reward beyond R. In
that case, rescuers will not incur pre-rescue care costs E(y). This will
lead to a decline in the probability of rescue, and victims will compensate for this by taking more care than they would at x*. In The
Starving Millionaire, for example, Anthony will realize that fewer
35. This assumes that all attempted rescues succeed. Were it otherwise, and rescuers
were unable to recover on a failed rescue, the salvage award for a successful rescue would have
to be increased.
36. The bargaining surplus is equal to (L-R) and represents the remaining value when
the cost of rescue is subtracted from the value of the victim.
37. Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 91-92.
38. See id. at 91. The assumption that the victim will concede the entire contractual
surplus to the rescuer is implausible. But neither will the rescuer be satisfied with R. Instead,
the parties can be expected to bargain for an intermediate rescue price, which will still distort
victim incentives.
39. If the rescuer receives the value L of the thing saved, then R = L in equation (2).
Solving for E, leaves us with equation (4). However, victims will not agree to a rescue unless
R < L, or, in other words R = (L-a) where a > 0. Equation (2) then becomes E. = -Px[(lP')L + Pr(L-a)]. After reducing the equation we are left with Ex = -PxV(L-P'a). Since pr and
a are both greater than zero, the quantity L-P'a is less than L, and equation (2) is less than
equation (4). Equation (4) then reflects excessive victim care.
40. See Landes & Posner, supra note 10, at 88-93.
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inns will be found in the desert, and might take excessive precautions
as compared to the socially optimal level of care at x*. Similarly,
permitting the rescuer to contract for the entire bargaining surplus
41
will distort incentives in the manner shown above.
Where y* > 0 and the entire bargaining surplus is assigned to
one of the parties, care levels will therefore be inefficient. One might
perhaps expect that the incentive failure could be corrected by splitting bargaining gains down the middle in some way. However, this
too will result in inefficient care levels. Suppose that, on the application of substantive fairness norms, rescuers are permitted to bargain
for only a portion f of L, where 0 < f < 1. Rescuers would then set
care levels at
Ey = fPIPv(L - R)
(5)
On comparing (5) with (3), care levels are seen to be distorted.
Since F < 1, the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves will
both shift to the left, and because of this, y < y*. 42 Rescuers will
take inadequate care, and victims may react to the anticipated reduction in p by making excessive investments in harm prevention.
The parties can be led to take efficient care through the application
of substantive fairness rules only if the efficient pre-rescue care decision by rescuers is no care at all.
Unlike substantive fairness rules, liability rules in accident law
can be constructed to lead the parties to take efficient pre-rescue
care regardless of the value of y.4 3 If liability rules impose the entire
cost of the harm less R on the rescuer when the victim has taken
44
efficient care, y = y* and x = x* is a unique, stable equilibrium.
But if liability rules are superior in this respect to fairness ones, not
every kind of accident is amenable to a liability regime. Imposing a
duty to rescue might be self-defeating where the rescue is costly,
since potential rescuers might shun those places where the duty is
likely to be triggered. The result would be fewer, not more, rescues.
When this happens, there is little reason to impose a duty to
41. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
42. See W. LANrS & R. POSNER, supra note 29, at 60.
43. See id. at 75-76.
44. See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 29, at 73-80; S. SHAVELL, supra note 29,
at 36-40. Victims will seek to minimize [PV(1 - PI)L + P'P'R] and rescuers PTpI(L - R) by
setting marginal costs ihi accordance with (2) and (3), respectively. Rescuers would also have
an adequate incentive to take efficient care under a substantive fairness rule which gave the
rescuer L if y = y* and R if y < y*. As shown in equation (4), however, this would distort
victim incentives.
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rescue.4 5
Barriers to first-best liability rules will lead to the imposition of

second-best fairness rules. Even then, not every unfair rescue would
qualify for relief on incentive theories. While the contract might be
set aside when y* = 0, substantive fairness norms should be resisted
where y* > 0 and limiting the rescuer's bargaining gains will increase the social cost of the accident because of the reduction in rescuer care. As an example of this, consider the following bargain.
The Unfortunate Traveller.-Boon has borrowed his employer's

car for a jaunt without first obtaining permission to do so. If he
returns the car within a few hours, the employer will not notice its
absence and all will be well. However, the roads are treacherous,
and Boon drives the car into a ditch at a particularly slippery point.
Knowing that cars are likely to become stuck at that point, JoeBob has pulled his tractor up to wait for accidents. When he sees
Boon's car in the ditch, he offers to pull it out for $500, which as it
happens is all the money Boon has on him. Joe-Bob is an exceedingly stubborn bargainer, and refuses to lower the price. Boon realizes that he will be unable to get the car out before his employer
notices its absence unless Joe-Bob helps him, and so he pays the
$500.
Joe-Bob incurred pre-rescue costs by lying in wait for an accident.
Without any prospect of reward beyond the actual costs of his rescue, he would not have entered the rescue business.4 1 In a hypothetical bargain, both Joe-Bob and Boon would therefore have agreed to
suspend the substantive fairness review.
As incentive theories predict, substantive fairness norms are
most likely to be imposed where rescuers can take little efficient prerescue care. When y* = 0, rescue contracts may be set aside even if
there is little evidence of duress. In Post v. Jones,47 for example, the
45. This explains the general absence of a duty to rescue. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 119-24. However, there are exceptions to this rule when the duty will

not reduce the level of rescuing. For example, when two ships collide, the master of each is
required to render assistance to individuals of both vessels. See 46 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(I) (Supp.
1987). A duty triggered by a collision will not lead potential rescuers to avoid the scene of a
rescue since they are already there. The duty does not arise unless the rescuer was involved in
an accident with the distressed vessel. See Berg v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 759 F.2d 1425, 1430
(9th Cir. 1985). Although a duty to rescue individuals lost at sea is imposed if it can be
effected without serious danger to other individuals or to the rescuing vessel. 46 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a) (Supp. 1987).
46. The analysis would be very different, however, if 'Joe-Bob had increased the
probability that Boon would require a rescue. See W. FAULKNER, THE REIVERs 80-91 (1962).
47. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150 (1856).
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master of the shipwrecked vessel might have chosen amongst three
possible rescuers, and an auction was conducted for his cargo
amongst them. s In these circumstances, the finding of duress by the
Supreme Court appeared strained.4 9 However, the rescue took place
off the Bering Straits of Czarist Alaska by whalers who were "the
only civilized visitors of the territory," 5 and it is difficult to imagine
what pre-rescue care the rescuers might efficiently have taken in
such a case.
Incentive theories may thus suggest an explanation for the
greater readiness of courts to set aside contracts of rescue made at
sea rather than on land. 1 While Landes and Posner attribute the
difference in rescue regimes to the greater economic sophistication of
maritime courts, a more plausible explanation is that cost functions
in the two kinds of rescues are typically different. 2 In the case of sea
rescues, there may be little that the rescuer can do before happening
upon the victim to increase the probability of the rescue.5 3 But the
48. Id. at 158-59.
49. The masters of the victim and one of the rescuers were brothers, and this might have
led the court to suspect a side payment between them. In addition, counsel for the cargo owners suggested that the master of the victim was in shock at the time of the agreement. However, the court abstained from making any findings as to these issues. See id. at 157.
50. Id. at 152.
51. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 118-19. A contract of rescue made
when a vessel is in danger of sinking and its owner has been held up for ransom by the rescuer
will not be enforced, with the rescuer's recovery limited to reliance or salvage damages. See,
e.g., The Port Caledonia, [1903] P. 184, 188 (setting aside a contract in which a tugmaster
offered to rescue a vessel for "10001 or no rope").
52. Landes and Posner argue that the maritime rules reflect a greater economic sophistication because (1) maritime technology has changed little over the centuries, allowing a stable
body of principles to evolve; (2) maritime bargains, which courts can mimic, may be negotiated with lower transaction costs; (3) competition in the provision of efficient maritime law is
easier than in the provision of non-maritime law; and (4) the benefits of substantive fairness
norms in sea rescues are greater than in land rescues, since there is greater competition in the
provision of land rescues. See Landes & Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 118-19. Of these
explanations, all but the last appear speculative. Even if a head start in the middle ages helps,
it is not clear why maritime law is significantly superior to the commercial law rules which
began to develop in fifteenth century merchant's courts. Cf. T. PLUCKNETr. A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 657-65. (5th ed. 1956) (discussing sources of maritime and mercantile law). Moreover, Landes and Posner note that low transactions costs cannot explain why
courts impeach sea rescue contracts where the cost of bargaining is prohibitive. Landes &
Posner, Salvors, supra note 10, at 118. In addition, a jurisdiction may compete as easily in the
provision of non-maritime as maritime law, and English common law courts have in fact been
enormously successful in attracting foreign litigants. See Kerr, Untangling Those Contract
Disputes, The Times (London), Apr. 3, 1990, at 32, col. 1, col. 2 (stating that in the Commercial Court, "foreign litigants have outnumbered the English since it was set up in 1895.").
53. See, e.g., Post v. Jones, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 150, 156, 158 (1856) (describing the fact
that the rescuing ships happened to be in the same area and were following the same course as
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same may not be true of land rescues, such as The Unfortunate
Traveller, and here the imposition of substantive fairness norms will
reduce the level of rescuing. On incentive theories, such contracts
would be enforced.

The enforceability of a rescue contract will nevertheless depend
more on the rescuer's cost functions than on whether the rescue

takes place on land or at sea. Rescuers at sea may take efficient prerescue care in the form of a professional sea rescue business.5 4 If
maritime law is efficient, substantive fairness norms will not be applied with so heavy a hand when the rescuer is a professional salvor. 55 As predicted by incentive theories, then, rescue agreements are

more likely to be enforced in such cases.5 6 In addition, prdfessional
rescuers are granted higher awards by courts on the application of
57
fairness norms through the principle of salvage.
Similarly, contracts of rescue on land may be set aside on incentive theories if y* is trivial. While enforcing the contract in The Unfortunate Traveller serves efficiency goals, it is considerably less
likely that the same is true of the rescue contract in The Starving

Millionaire.While Joe-Bob could expect a steady stream of customers, Conrad could not have anticipated many guests like Anthony. If
so, enforcing the bargain between Conrad and Anthony would not
greatly affect the number of inns which are built. Incentive theories
therefore suggest an explanation for the "status" obligation of innkeepers to offer their guests food and shelter on reasonable terms. 58
the wrecked ship).
54. See Brough, Liability Salvage - by Private Ordering, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 97-98
(1990).
55. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 581 (2d ed. 1975).
56. See id.
57. See The Lamington, 86 F. 675, 684 (2d Cir. 1898) (stating that the skill attained
from long experience, coupled with more powerful machinery, "are of more service to an imperiled vessel than is the aid which may be expected from a chance rescuer. To provide such
skill, machinery, and appliances, and to keep them always ready for instant service, though
they may be called for but occasionally, is now regarded as a meritorious act, calling for a
liberal award.").
Salvage awards always exceed the recovery of reliance damages R in quantum meruit.
See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 55, at 562-66. While reliance damages figure importantly in the award, the amount of recovery also depends on the value of the rescued vessel.
The result is an award which gives rescuers an incentive to incur pre-rescue costs, though not
to the same extent as enforcement of an extortionate rescue contract would. See Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. National Oil Transp. Co., 281 F. 336 (S.D. Tex. 1922) (illustrating the
differences among quantum meruit, salvage, and enforcement of a rescue contract.).
58. Innkeepers exercise a public or "common" calling, which imposes on them the obligation to lodge and entertain guests for reasonable compensation. See Howth v. Franklin, 20
Tex. 798, 800 (1858); Thompson v. Lacy, 106 Eng. Rep. 667, 668 (1820); Molot, The Duty of
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Though ostensibly motivated by distributional considerations and the
interests of guests, such laws benefit innkeepers by increasing the
incentives of guests to travel.
II.

COOPERATION THEORIES

On cooperation theories, substantive fairness norms reduce the
probability of a bargaining breakdown by providing a focal point for
agreement."9 Because fair outcomes commend themselves to bargainers, fewer parties will insist on an unfair division of bargaining gains.
A fair price review by a court will therefore reinforce the expectations of the parties as to suitable outcomes.8 0
A.

The Level of Bargaining

Contract negotiations perform two functions: they identify the
set of efficient terms and determine each party's share of the bargaining gains. The first function establishes the amount of joint
gains, while the second divides them up. The two functions may
work at cross-purposes. Each party will want as large a share of the
surplus as possible, and so has an incentive to adopt a "hard" bargaining strategy.6 1 However, a claim for disproportionate individual
Business to Serve the Public: Analogy to the Innkeeper's Obligation, 46 CAN. BAR REv. 612,
614-18 (1968). Nowadays, the prohibition against price discrimination is also to be found in
regulatory statutes which require that hotel rates be publicly posted and which forbid higher
charges than those posted. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 206 (Consol. 1988).
59. Cooter, Marks & Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable
Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 228 (1982) (stating that "[t]he fundamental obstacle to cooperation is the absence of an authoritative rule for dividing the stakes").
60. Cooperation theories have been advanced by Cooter, Marks and Mnookin, whose
"Hobbes Theorem" is an extreme version of this view of substantive fairness. See Cooter,
Marks & Mnookin, supra note 59, at 243 (postulating that "[p]rivate bargaining to redistribute external costs will not achieve efficiency unless there is an institutional mechanism to dictate the terms of the contract for dividing the stakes."). While not subscribing to the Hobbes
Theorem, the authors also reject the Coase Theorem, under which all efficiency bargains are
concluded, and suggest that legal rules should chill the worst threats which the parties might
make against each other. Id. at 247.
In addition, the medieval just price doctrine is explained on cooperation theories in Fried.
man, In Defense of Thomas Aquinas and the Just Price, 12 HIsT. POL. ECON. 234 (1980).
Friedman argues that just price theories could not easily be enforced by a court because of
difficulties in assessing utility functions. Id. at 236-38. However, as a less intrusive norm
weighing upon the conscience of the bargainers, he suggests that the doctrine had much to
commend it. Id. at 238. See also Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 HARV. J.t & PUB.
PoL'y 639, 655, 687-88 (1989) (stating that substantive fairness norms may be imposed to
solve division problems in bargaining).
61. Experimental studies have often found that hard bargainers outperform their rivals,
at least for those agreements which are reached. See, e.g., S. SIEGEL & L. FOURAKER, supra
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gains may result in a breakdown of negotiations and a loss of joint
gains. 2 The negotiating strategy must therefore strike a balance between excessive and inadequate cooperation. While the former strategy concedes too much of the bargaining surplus to the other party,
63
the latter risks its destruction.
In any society, the level of bargaining will depend on the prevalence of norms of cooperation. Amongst a group of unconstrained
maximizers, the pursuit of individual gains will reduce the number
of agreements which are concluded. In a less grasping society, by
contrast, habits of compromise will encourage the formation of contracts. The first society will then be poorer than the second. 4 For
note 4, at 60-69, 82-85, 99 (1960) (demonstrating a positive correlation between a bargainer's
"level of aspiration" and his returns); Chertkoff & Conley, Opening Offer and Frequency of
Concession as Bargaining Strategies, 7 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 181 (1967)
(finding that sellers who led off with extreme initial offers outperform other parties).
62. Tough bargaining may jeopardize the bargain by inducing the opponent to dig in his
heels. See Roth, Toward a Focal Point Theory of Bargaining,in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS
OF BARGA1NING 259, 265-67 (A Roth ed. 1985) (finding a greater frequency of disagreement
when distance between parties' negotiating position is greater); Benton, Kelley & Liebling,
Effects of Extremity of Offers and Concession Rate on the Outcomes of Bargaining, 24 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 73, 80 (1972) (finding that extreme demands elicit extreme counterdemands); Druckman, The Influence of the Situation in Interparty Conflict, 15
J. CONFLICT RES. 523 (1971) (distinguishing effects of personality and situation on the level of
disagreement); Komorita & Esser, Frequency of Reciprocal Concessions in Bargaining,32 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 699, 703 (1975) (finding that the "toughest" strategy induces a lower level of concession-making by the opponent).
Even if the deal might be lost, a party may rationally refuse to compromise because of
reputational considerations. If information persists over time, present toughness may persuade
future opponents that a bargainer is unlikely to make substantial concessions. Present bargains
may therefore be sacrificed for the future gains attributable to reputational advantages. See

Wilson, Reputations in Games and Markets, in

GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING

27 (A Roth ed. 1985). Though privately optimal, efforts to gain such a reputation may, however, be socially wasteful if they reduce the level of bargaining.

63. See D. LAX & J. SEBENIUs, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 38 (1986) (describing the problem of choice of bargaining
strategy as "the Negotiator's Dilemma"); Bartos, Concession Making in Experimental Negotiations,in SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES IN PROGRESS 3, 19 (J. Berger, M. Zelditch & B. Anderson eds. 1966) (finding that a moderately hard strategy is optimal). This is not to say, however, that over time one group of bargainers will outperform the other. Instead, a stable
equilibrium may result, with no member of either group having an incentive to adopt a different bargaining strategy. See R. SUGDEN, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND
WELFARE 22-29 (1986) (Nash equilibrium in division games).
The possibility that not all efficient bargains will be concluded has been suggested as a
criticism of the Cease Theorem. See Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 23
(1982) (stating that "[t]he error in the bargaining version of the Coase Theorem is to suppose
that the obstacle to cooperation is the cost of communicating, rather than the strategic nature
of the situation"); Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J. LAw & EcoN. 427,
435-37 (1972).
64. The relationship between unconstrained greed and poverty was noted by Max
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this reason, norms which constrain hard bargaining may serve efficiency goals. These norms are in part social, with non-cooperative
strategies viewed with disfavor and "fair dealing" prized as a commercial virtuee 5 But courts may also enforce cooperative norms by
leaning against the enforcement of hard bargains.
Setting aside a bargain on substantive fairness norms will result
in an immediate efficiency loss, since the parties will forego the gains
from that agreement. However, future bargainers will react to the
imposition of fairness norms by scaling back extreme claims in the
course of negotiations, and the net result may be a significant increase in the number of contracts. 6 In cooperation theories, then,
there is a striking difference between the doctrine of substantive fairness and other rules of contract law. Where bargains are vitiated by
fraud, duress or incapacity, the level of contracting is assumed to be
excessive. Alone amongst contract rules, substantive fairness norms
seek to increase the number of bargains.
Weber. See M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 57 (1958)
(stating that "[t]he universal reign of absolute unscrupulousness in the pursuit of selfish interests by the making of money has been a specific characteristic of precisely those countries
whose bourgeois-capitalistic development, measured according to Occidental standards, has remained backward."); see also G. GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 22-27 (1981) (suggesting
that free market economies rely on dispositions of altruism and trust). Similarly, negotiation
manuals often suggest that those who communicate a concern for their fellows need not wait
until the next world for their reward. See Luban, Bargainingand Compromise: Recent Work
On Negotiation and Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 397, 399 (1985) (stating that the
opposite party is to be treated as a collaborator rather than as an adversary). If sincerity is the
best pose, there may be no necessary contradiction between deeply-felt cooperative norms and
self-interest.
65.

See I. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CON-

44-47 (1980) (describing how the norm of "mutuality" in exchange
facilitates bargaining); Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (asserting that norms of fair dealing constrain businessmen). Where the efficiency gains are regarded as morally good, the predisposition to cooperate in bargaining acquires a moral force. See D. GAUTHIER. MORALS BY AGREEMENT 150-51
(1986) (suggesting that norms of constrained maximization promote justice). For a discussion
of how such norms may be internalized through feelings of distress, see Walster, Berscheid &
Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, 25 J. PERSONAITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 151
(1973).
66. Judges and arbitrators might also impose fairness norms because they have internalized them. Indeed, a judge might easily sacrifice efficiency for equity considerations through
excessive judicial screening. While this leaves bargainers in a worse position, it reinforces the
judge's opinion of himself as a fair-minded person. See Leventhal, Michaels & Sanford, Inequity and InterpersonalConflict: Reward Allocation and Secrecy About Reward as Methods of
Preventing Conflict, 23 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 88, 100 (1972) (suggesting that
where rewards are publicly known, arbitrators inflate rewards of worst performers). The possibility of judicial misbehavior of this kind argues for restricting the scope of substantive fairness
norms to egregious cases of unfairness.
TRACTUAL RELATIONS
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B.

A CoordinationProblem
67
On cooperation theories, bargaining is a coordination problem.
What distinguishes a coordination game from other kinds of games
is that, in it, all parties seek to adopt the same strategy., For example, the choice of which side of the road to drive on is a coordination
problem, because drivers do not care much which side is chosen as
long as all drivers stick to the same side.6 9 Thus, a custom or rule
that cars are to be driven on the right (or the left) assists drivers in
coordinating their activity.7 0 Similarly, bargainers will find it easier
to reach agreement when, by convention, all parties recognize a particular division of the contractual gains as appropriate. Substantive
fairness norms in contract law may then promote cooperation by
reinforcing expectations as to the division of contractual gains.
On cooperation theories, the level of bargaining is endowed with
moral status, but the solution chosen is not. Substantive fairness
norms are meant to promote bargaining, and are not meant to mandate a particular payoff to the parties. For this reason, the solution
imposed by the court will merely mimic the outcomes selected by
most bargainers, whatever these might be. Otherwise, the fairness
review will result in fewer, not more, agreements. Thus, if righthanded bargainers systematically outperformed left-handed ones, the
fairness norms would have a right-handed bias. Although favoring
left-handed bargainers through fairness norms might serve distributional goals, it could not be defended on cooperation theories.
C. Sociological and Axiomatic Theories
If the criterion of substantive fairness is whether the solution is
one generally reached by bargainers, a court will find this standard
difficult to apply. Without facilities for game theoretic experiments,
a judge must rely on proxies for the outcomes selected in the real
world. In the case of bargaining solutions, two different kinds of
proxies, sociological and axiomatic, may be suggested.
Sociological norms are defined by the social conventions of a
67. D. Lawsws, CONVENTION (1969) (describing the theory and solutions of coordination
problems).
68. See id. at 8-24 (1969) (defining coordination problems as "situations in which, relative to some classification of actions, the agents have a common interest in doing the same one
of several alternative actions."). Bargaining is analyzed as a coordination problem in T.
SCHELLING, supra note 5, at 67-74, which notes that agreements are more likely to be reached
around easily accessible figures, such as equal divisions or round numbers.
69. D. LEwis, supra note 67, at 6.
70. See id. at 5-8 (listing examples of coordination problems).
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particular society."1 A sociologicafly fair solution is simply one which
a majority of bargainers would recognize as such, on principles of
common sense morality. Since they are highly accessible to courts,
sociological norms might easily be taken to define legal norms of
fairness.
Axiomatic norms of substantive fairness are derived from simplifying assumptions about how parties bargain. For example,
David Gauthier has argued for the universal appeal of a principle of
minimax relative concession.73 According to Gauthier's model, each
bargainer begins by claiming the entire bargaining surplus, conceding a portion of it in order to reach an agreement.74 A complete
concession would take him from the utility level U1 at the point of
75
maximum gain to the utility level U0 at the disagreement point.
Where he concedes to the intermediate outcome U, the relative magnitude of the concession is [UI-U]/[U 1-U0 ].7' This ratio, called the
"relative concession," measures each party's willingness to concede.77
A higher ratio indicates that a bargainer will have more to lose from
disagreement and will be more ready to give in.78 Therefore, the parties will bargain to a position of minimax relative concession, with
the maximum relative concession demanded of any party being as
small as possible. 9
Axiomatic solution theories are considerably less accessible than
sociological ones. A judge will rarely be able to measure utility increments with anything near the precision required by axiomatic
theories. Nevertheless, it will often be easy to recognize differences
between axiomatic and sociological solutions. In The Starving Millionaire, for example, the price charged for the food will likely be
71.

See Roth, Malouf & Murningham, Sociological Versus Strategic Factors in Bar-

gaining, 2 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 153, 167 (1981) (defining social conventions as

"customs or beliefs which are commonly shared by members of a particular society.").
72.
(1953).

See, e.g., Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 ECONOMETRICA 128, 129

73. See D. GAUTHIER, supra note 65, at 133-46. For two-person bargaining games,
Gauthier's solution is identical to that suggested in Kalai & Smorodinsky, Other Solutions to

Nash's BargainingProblem, 43 ECONOMETRICA 513 (1975). Similar claims have been made
for the rival theory of John Nash. See Nash, The BargainingProblem, 18 EcONOMTRICA 155
(1950); Nash, supra note 72. See generally A. ROTH, AXIOMATIC MODELS OF BARGAINING
(1979).
74. D. GAUTMER, supra note 65, at 133-34.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 136.
Id.
A value of 0 indicates no concession and a value of 1 indicates full concession. Id.
See id. at 137.
Id. at 136-37.
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sociologically unfair if it exceeds that charged by a good Washington

restaurant for comparable food. By contrast, a fair solution on
Gauthier's model would be far higher than this. Anthony will be far
more ready to concede to a sociologically fair price than Conrad, and
before their relative concession ratios are equal the price will be sociologically unfair.
In addition to being more accessible, sociological theories reflect
real world solutions more accurately than axiomatic theories. Real

world findings are hard to come by, 80 so that the best evidence of
how parties actually bargain is provided by experimental studies. 8'
These studies examine the responses of subjects (usually university
students) to bargaining problems, and generally are more consistent
with sociological than axiomatic theories. 82
The greater accuracy of sociological theories may be seen in lottery division games. In these games, the parties bargain over the di-

vision of lottery tickets," with winning tickets giving their .holders
valuable prizes. The Gauthier theory predicts that each bargainer
will receive 50% of the tickets, regardless of the value of the prizes
or what is known by one party about the other's prize. When the
parties are informed as to each other's prizes, however, solutions are

found to cluster around both the equal probability and the "equal
80. For an interesting exception, see Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive
Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.J. 549 (1989) (reporting evidence of
inefficient outcomes on the decision of Illinois employees as to participation in an incentive
payment scheme involving newly unemployed workers).
81. Id. at 551. For a discussion of the weight to be given to experimental results as
evidence of real world solutions, see Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics:
An Introduction, 85 CoLuM. L. Rav. 991 (1985), and Smith, Microeconomic Systems as an
Experimental Science, 72 AMi.ECON. REv. 923 (1982).
82. See Roth, BargainingPhenomena and BargainingTheory, in LABORATORY ExPERIMENTATION IN ECONOMICS: SIX PoINTrs OF VIEW 14, 40 (A. Roth ed. 1987) [hereinafter LABoRATORY EXPERIMENTATION]; ROTH, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview, 98 ECON. J. 974, 979-83 (1988) [hereinafter Roth, A Methodological
Overview] (finding that laboratory experiments can investigate notions such as "common
knowledge," but axiomatic theories failed to describe observed behavior).
83. Experimenters rely on lottery tickets in order to control for uncertainties over the
bargainers' utility functions. See Smith, Theory, Experiment,-andEconomics, 3 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 151, 159 (1989). Were the parties to negotiate for the prizes themselves, and not for
tickets for the prizes, the Gauthier and Nash solutions would both depend on how much each
party valued the prize. The valuation problem would make it difficult to verify the solution,
unless it was arbitrarily assumed that utilities are linear with money. Id. When the players
bargain for lottery tickets, on the other hand, outcomes are less sensitive to differences in
utility functions. The probability of receiving a prize might then be adopted as a proxy for the
utility gain, even if preferences for the prizes are dissimilar, and even if the prizes each party
will win are of different value. Id. at 159-60.
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expected value" outcomes,84 with a mean value approximately half
way between them."5 These findings are inconsistent with the
Gauthier theory, but may be explained on sociological theories if either result would commend itself to the parties on social norms of
fairness.8 "
84. In an equal expected value solution, the party with the smaller prize will receive a
larger number of tickets. For example, where the prizes for Party A and B are $10 and $20,
respectively, an equal probability division will give each party 50% of the tickets and an equal
expected value division will give Party A two-thirds and Party B one-third of the tickets.
85. See Roth & Malouf, Game-Theoretic Models and the Role of Information in Bargaining, 86 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 574, 580-82 (1979); see also Nydegger & Owen, Two-person Bargaining:An Experimental Test of the Nash Axioms, 3 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 239
(1975) (discussing equal monetary outcomes). Similarly, bargainers who were informed about
their opponents' monetary payoffs were found to react differently than bargainers whose information was limited to artificial commodities (with the lottery tickets paid off in "chips"). See
Roth, Malouf & Murnighan, Sociological Versus Strategic Factorsin Bargaining,2 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 153, 174 (1981). The difference should not matter under the
Gauthier and Nash theories. The authors also conclude that the differences in the results
would have been less striking if perceptions as to fairness could have been manipulated by the
parties. While the two games were strategically equivalent, they were quite different from a
sociological perspective. Therefore the results suggest that sociological norms independently
affect bargaining outcomes. See id. at 175.
86. See Guth, On the Behavioral Approach to DistributiveJustice: A Theoretical and
Experimental Investigation, in 2 APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 703, 710 (S. Maital ed.
1988). Fairness norms may be strongly felt, with bargainers willing to bear a personal loss to
punish another party for unfairness. In ultimatum games, for example, one party (the "controller") divides up a fixed amount of money and the other must accept or reject his share. If
he rejects it, neither party receives anything. Although it might seem rational for the second
player to accept any offer, a substantial portion of such parties are willing to reject unequal,
positive offers. See Selten, The Equity Principlein Economic Behavior, in DECISION THEORY
AND SOCIAL ETHICS, ISSUES IN SOCIAL CHOICE 289 (H. Gottinger & W. Leinfeller eds. 1978);
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Fairnessand the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. Bus. S285
(1986).
In addition, many of the controllers divide up the gains equally. See Guth, Schmittberger
& Schwarz, An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIATION 367 (1982). So strong are fairness norms that in one experiment many controllers
offered equal payoffs when they would have received a higher amount on disagreement, with
the preference for fairness trumping individual rationality. See Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase
Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 94 (1982). But see Harrison &
McKee, Experimental Evaluation of the Coase Theorem, 28 J.L. & ECON. 653, 662-66
(1985) (reporting individually rational allocations when controllers had unilateral property
rights on disagreement).
In part, these findings might be attributed to the parties' unfamiliarity with the game.
Thus, one study found that controllers behaved strategically, rather than fairly, when the game
was repeated a second time. See Binmore, Shaked & Sutton, Testing NoncooperativeBargaining Theory: A PreliminaryStudy, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1178, 1179-80 (1985). But see Harrison
& McKee, supra, at 662-63 (no evidence of learning behavior in three sessions). In addition,
strategic or non-fair behavior is more likely to be encountered in other kinds of games, with
different off-the-equlibrium-path incentives. See V. Prasnikar & A. Roth, Perceptions of Fairness and Considerations of Strategy in Bargaining: Some Experimental Data 11-12 (Jan. 10,
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Such experiments indicate that the parties may not always have
the clearest idea of what constitutes a fair division of bargaining
gains. Instead of a single touchstone of fairness, sociological norms
might suggest two fair outcomes, as in the lottery division game.
Even where fairness is a single-peaked norm, the parties might recognize a range of more or less fair outcomes as opposed to a specific
solution. Although psychologists have sought to give some content to
social norms of fairness under "equity" theories, 87 such norms are
subjective and adherence to them is difficult to verify. 8 In addition,
fairness concerns are highly sensitive to the manner in which
problems are framed, 89 and are therefore capable of manipulation by
the parties.9 0
Sociological theories might then appear open to an objection of
indeterminacy. 9 1 If fairness norms are imprecise, they will not offer
the parties a focal point for bargaining. This is not to say, however,
1989) (unpublished manuscript on file at Hofstra Law Review) (reporting that strategic behavior was observed in "best shot" games).
In spite of such criticisms, the overall evidence indicates that axiomatic or strategic models are poor predictors of the parties' behavior in ultimatum games. See, e.g., Roth, A Methodological Overview, supra note 82, at 984-88 (describing recent studies of division games that
support sociological theories).
87. Equity theorists suggest that gains are divided in proportion to each party's contributions. For equal inputs, then, the parties would receive equal outcomes. See Leventhal &
Michaels, Extending the Equity Model: Perceptionsof Inputs and Allocation of Reward as a
Function of Duration and Quality of Performance, 12 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
303 (1969). In the context of bargaining games, an equitable solution would be one in which
gains are divided in proportion to each party's contribution to the joint gains. Id.
88. For example, there may be significant disagreement as to the valuation of inputs and
outputs, as well as the appropriate remedy for inequity. See Pritchard, Equity Theory; A Review and Critique,4 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & Hum. PERFORMANCE 176, 179-80 (1969). In
addition, other social norms may undercut the equitable distribution of rewards. For example,
an allocator might select inequitable rewards in order to prevent interpersonal conflict or to
promote equality rather than equity. See Leventhal, Michaels & Sanford, supra note 66, at
100 (finding the greatest inequity where awards were known to all parties); Shapiro, Effect of
Expectations of Future Interactionon Reward Allocations in Dyads: Equity or Equality, 31
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 873, 878-79 (1975) (finding that the allocators tend to
suppress equity in favor of equality norms where probability of future interaction with the
subjects increases).
89. Framing effects may arise when economically identical issues are stated in terms of
different reference states. See, e.g., Yaari & Bar-Hillel, On Dividing Justly, 1 Soc. CHOICE &
WELFARE 1 (1984) (stating that findings differ where problems are stated in terms of needs
rather than tastes).
90. See Roth & Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining:An Experimental Study, 73 AM. ECON. Rav. 362 (1983)(discussing how evidence of bargainers' expectations regarding likely outcomes can be manipulated).
91. See Roth & Schoumaker, supra note 90, at 362 (discussing factors which bear on
indeterminacy).
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that fairness norms are devoid of content. While it may be difficult
to specify a uniquely fair outcome, there will often be broad agreement about when a bargain is unfair, as in The Starving Millionaire. The objection of indeterminacy is therefore unpersuasive when
the legal norm is limited to egregious examples of unfairness, as are
common law rules of substantive fairness.
Sociological solutions need not be efficient. Thus, a court might
decline to enforce a term which efficiently shifts risks to consumers
because it is perceived as unfair. On sociological theories, such terms
should not be enforced when losses from the decline in bargaining
exceed gains through the efficient specification of terms. 2 Evidence
that cooperation gains may exceed such losses is provided by the failure of firms to adopt optimizing policies when these conflict with
social norms. For example, opportunities for price increases during a
temporary shortage are sometimes foregone when the higher price
93
would give the firm a reputation for sharp practice.
D. The Scope of the FairnessReview
Legal norms are more consistent with sociological than axiomatic norms. For example, the bargain in The Starving Millionaire
will likely conflict with sociological norms, but not with axiomatic
ones. The status obligations of innkeepers at common law therefore
resemble the former more closely than the latter. 4 Indeed, were axiomatic theories applied by the courts, the innkeeper might seek to
set aside the bargain if he sold the food at a moderate price in a
moment of altruism.
The scope of the fairness review will depend on the probability
92.

Of course, the smaller the difference between fairness and efficiency norms, the

wealthier the society will be. There might therefore be something to say for legal norms which
diverge from social ones in the direction of greater efficiency, if social norms are thereby
changed. For the purposes of this Article, however, fairness constraints in society are taken as

fixed.
93. See Olmstead & Rhode, Rationing Without Government: The West Coast Gas
Famine of 1920, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 1044, 1052-53 (1985)(describing the West Coast gasoline
shortage of 1920. The oil companies reframed from raising prices because they were concerned

with public outcry over a price increase which was not caused by increased costs). The firm
might fear that consumers will punish it for unfairness through a boycott. In addition, consumers might take fair pricing policies to signal efficient terms and competitive prices. Paradoxically, then, a firm might be led to adopt fair but inefficient policies because they are taken to
signal efficiency. See Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Fairnessas a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 728 (1986)(discussing fairness theories);
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 86.
94. See supra notes 24-45.
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of a bargaining breakdown.9 5 On cooperation theories, fairness
norms are most plausibly imposed when transaction costs are high
and there is little opportunity for lengthy negotiations.9 6 The likelihood of disagreement also increases where parties do not deal on a
face-to-face basis. Cooperation theories might then explain why
rescue contracts are set aside, at least where neither party has much

time or ability to discuss terms, and where they negotiate across
some distance. Not all rescue contracts are of this kind, and it is
unlikely that the contract in The Starving Millionairewould be impeached on such theories. As unfair as the contract might be,
Anthony can be expected to concede to Conrad's terms. It is different, however, where the contract must be negotiated quickly and
there is no face-to-face communication between the parties. Historically, these conditions were likely more prevalent in sea than in land
rescues, and thus might explain the greater readiness of courts to set
95. The experimental evidence as to the probablity of a bargaining breakdown is inconclusive. In a series of tests, Hoffman and Spitzer found that bargainers seldom fail to reach
agreement or to exploit all opportunites for gain, even in dealings among members of large
groups. See Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 81; Hoffman & Spitzer, Experimental Tests of
the Coase Theorem with Large BargianingGroups, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (1986) (discussing the problem of holdouts as the number parties increases). The large group experiments
are of particular interest, since the probability of impasse because of a lone hard bargainer will
increase as the group becomes larger. However, other studies reported non-trivial probabilites
of disagreement. Thus, unfair splits are frequently rejected in division games. See Selten, The
Equity Principle in Economic Behavior, in DECISION THEORY AND SOCIAL ETHICS, ISSUES IN
SOCIAL CHOICE 289 (H. Gottinger & W. Leinfellner eds. 1978); Kahneman, Knetch & Thaler, supra note 86. see also Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J.
LEGAL STUD. 237, 264 (1988) (finding only 20% of agreements to be efficient); Roth,
Murnighan & Schoumaker, The DeadlineEffect in Bargaining:Some Experimental Evidence,
78 AM. ECON. REv. 806, 811 (1988) (reporting disagreements in 23% of cases); Roth, Bargaining Phenomena and Bargaining Theory, in LABORATORY EXPERIMENTATION, supra note
82 (summarizing evidence of significant levels of disagreement); Malouf & Roth, Disagreement in Bargaining:An Experimental Study, 25 J. CONFLICT RES. 329, 339 (1981) (finding
non-trivial levels of disagreement in binary lottery games).
96. Shortening the period of negotiations can be expected to increase the probability of
disagreement. See Coursey, Bilateral Bargaining,Pareto Optimality, and the EmpiricalFrequency of Impasse, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 243 (1982) (finding that a greater
number of disagreements and non-optimal agreements were reported when negotiation time
was shortened). One reason for the greater number of disagreements may be that claims are
often more extreme in the early stages of bargaining. See Benton, Kelley & Liebling, supra
note 62, at 73.
97. See, e.g., RADNER & SCHOTTER, THE SEALED BID MECHANIsM: AN EXPERIMENTAL
STUDY (New York University, Dep't of Economics, Research Report No. 87-41, 1987) (noting that face-to-face bargaining is more likely to capture gains from trade than sealed-bid
mechanisms). The importance of context in bargaining experiments is emphasized in Roth, A
Methodological Overview, supra note 82, at 988-91; Ochs & Roth, An ExperimentalStudy of
Sequential Bargaining,79 AM. ECON. REv. 355, 378-80 (1989).
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8

The Objection from Property Rights

Cooperation theories may appear to trench on the property
rights of the superior bargainer. This is most easily seen where an
overwhelming comparative threat advantage rests on a property interest, as in The Starving Millionaire. The innkeeper's insistence on
a high price for the food is an assertion of his right to retain or sell
his property on his own terms. Even when property is not sold, the
imposition of substantive fairness norms may offend principles of
self-ownership. Thus, disproportionate bargaining gains might be attributed to superior negotiating skills. 99 If these skills give their possessor a greater share of the contractual surplus, they may be more
valuable than, for example, Wayne Gretzky's hockey skills. Blunting
negotiating skills through a fairness review would then resemble a
regime of community property in skating skills.
Cooperation theorists might concede the analogy to property
rights, but seek to justify the taking. When extreme threat advantages are based on property interests, as in The Starving Millionaire, a strict insistence on property rights might seem unjust, and the
imposition of substantive fairness norms might seem the lesser evil.
As between Conrad's right to retain his food and Anthony's right to
life, the latter would then take priority.10 0 In addition, rights to contractual gains obtained through negotiating skills might be challenged on theories of desert. If a skill is not deserved unless selfcreated, the chance which allocates it to an individual will not
ground a moral claim for its fruits.10 1 On this basis, gains derived
through hockey or negotiation skills would have to be shared.
It is nonetheless difficult to justify the imposition of substantive
fairness norms on arguments for expropriation. The Starving Mil98. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
99. See Leff, Thomist Unconscionability,4 CAN. Bus. L.J. 424 (1979-80) (arguing that
the real concern of the doctrine of unconscionability is undeserved advantages).
100. Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas modified his defense of private property to permit a
taking in cases of extreme need. See St. Thomas Aquinas, 38 SUIMMA THEOLOGICAE 81 (M.
LeFbure O.P. trans. 1975) (stating that "in the case of necessity everything is common."). Of
course, a broad relaxation of property rights might result in more, not less, famine, as farmers
lose the incentive to grow food. But this is not to say that every violation of property rights is
unjustifiable in a moral system which places a value on the avoidance of starvation. In catastrophic cases, it might be thought best to violate property rights, even when account is taken
of incentive effects. See Sen, Property and Hunger, 4 EcoN. & PHIL. 57, 62-63 (1988).
101. See J. RAWLS, supra note 1, at 136-42 (de~cribing a hypothetical bargain behind a
"veil of ignorance" as to personal attributes).
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lionaire shows that rules meant to cover the normal case do not apply in more drastic examples of unfair bargaining. Similarly, barriers to self-ownership of negotiation skills violate strong moral
concerns about individual rights" °2 and weaken the incentives of talented individuals to profit from their skills.
But even if cooperation theories do not justify the expropriation
of property, the objection from property rights is still unpersuasive.
While alienation rights are one of the incidents of ownership, restrictions on alienation are not troubling when based on the assumption
of cooperation gains. A property regime which inefficiently permitted
non-cooperative behavior would be no more attractive than one
which inefficiently failed to sanction fraud. Thus, all parties would
agree to the fairness review in a hypothetical bargain.
Success in driving a hard bargain might also result from personality traits which cannot easily be described as skills. In The Unfortunate Traveller, for example, Joe-Bob's stubbornness wins him the
$500, where a more sympathetic person would have modified his demands. The analogy to property rights is weak in such cases, and the
moral concern for individual rights is even weaker. In addition, bargaining skills need not refer to an adroitness at cutting a one-sided
deal, but may instead depend on a greater ability to reach agreement. The two goals may even work at cross-purposes, since a reputation for driving hard bargains may reduce one's ability to arrive at
future agreements. 0 3 In this sense, the enforcement of substantive
fairness norms would not conflict with negotiation skills, but instead
would enhance them. When substantively unfair bargains are not enforced, the skilled negotiator would find that the pool of potential cocontractors has expanded.
III.

SCREENING THEORIES

Screening theories may also explain why courts strike down unfair contractual terms.104 Consumers frequently sign standard form
agreements without reading them. While a careful review of contract
terms would reduce the likelihood of oppressive provisions, this cannot be done without incurring information, production or screening
102. For this reason, Nozick argues that a justification for personal skills need not be
given: some qualities are simply possessed. See R_ NozIcK, supra note 1, at 224-27.
103. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
104. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rav. 630, 630 (1979) (discussing legisla-

tive and judicial intervention in the consumer markets).
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costs. Because of these costs, consumers may prefer to take the risks
of one-sided, inefficient terms. 105 When such provisions may be identified more easily by a court than by consumers, a substantive fairness review may be defended on screening theories.
This Article argues that screening efficiencies may exist, but are
agnostic as to the proper scope of the substantive fairness review. In
general, the review will not be intrusive when the contract is signed
by the consumer, for the signature operates as a waiver of fairness
norms. But if signed contracts are presumptively fair, an extremely
unfair provision will still be set aside. As a consequence, the controversy surrounding the effect to be given to a signature is debatable as
to the breadth of mandatory substantive fairness norms, and not to
their existence.
The fairness norms imposed on incentive and cooperation theories are substantive, in that consensual agreements between parties
of full capacity are not enforced because of an unfair division of contractual gains. By contrast, screening norms appear procedural, since
unfair terms, if consented to, will ordinarily be enforced.10 6 In extreme cases, however, screening norms may also be substantive, and
strike down unfair terms whatever the evidence as to consent.10 7 As a
term becomes more onerous, better evidence of consent will be required before it is enforced. For extremely harsh terms, which few
parties would ever agree to, the costs of a procedural review by a
court may exceed any benefits available to the parties through enforcement. All such terms should then be set aside, with the substantive prohibition serving as a proxy for procedural concerns. 08
A.

Term Screening

The terms of a contract include both the express provisions of
105. In a privately-efficient screening decision, the marginal benefits of risk reduction
equal marginal screening costs. The seminal article on equilibrium models of screening is Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 213 (1961); see also A. DEATON & J.
MUELLBAUER, ECONOMICS AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 410-12 (1980); Schwartz & Wilde,
supra note 104, at 682 (discussing imperfect information and market intervention).
106. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C.
1964) (upholding a security clause although the court thought it was exploitative).
107. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 104, at 678 n.104 (defining substantive unconscionability as results that affect a contracting party too harshly or have an adverse effect on a
non-contracting party).
108. See Hare, What is Wrong with Slavery?, 8 PHIL & PuB. A. 103 (1979) (arguing
that while an agreement to sell oneself into slavery might be individually rational in an extremely small number of cases, the difficulties of establishing consent argue for an outright
prohibition).
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the bargain and the terms implied by a court. Screening usefully
explains why terms are implied by a court. 109 Due to the costs of
identifying and specifying a full set of express terms in a complete
contingent contract,"10 bargainers are offered a stock of default or
implied terms.' 11 This permits the parties to omit an express term

which merely duplicates a default one. In this way, default terms
reduce the costs of bargaining." 2

Like default terms, substantive fairness norms import new terms
into a bargain. But unlike default terms, the fairness norms are
mandatory and override contrary express provisions. For this reason,
the imposition of substantive fairness norms cannot be justified on
the same basis as default terms."13 It does not suffice that a majority
of bargainers would commit to fairness norms, as they might to default terms.11 4
Screening efficiencies, which explain why default regimes are
adopted, may nevertheless be invoked to justify mandatory contractual terms.1 ' 5 Where the parties are unable to specify an efficient set
of terms, they may be better off if a court does it for them. In standard form agreements, for example, the barrier to the private specification of terms is the screening costs which consumers must bear in
reading the contract. They will find it much easier to search for bar109. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA. L. REV. 1089,
1089-90 (1981)(stating that parties can allocate risks of future contingencies but cannot always anticipate every future contingency).
110. A complete contingent contract is one which specifies the obligations of the parties
in every possible state of the world. The contract would then have to incorporate clear rules for
every possible future dispute between the parties. See id. at 1090.
111. See id. (stating that "contract rules serve as standard or common risk allocations").
112. Id.
113. Unlike the doctrine of unconscionability, a rule of interpretation cannot in theory
trump an unambiguous express term. Nevertheless, Professors Goetz and Scott have noted that
presumptive rules may ossify into something close to an irrebuttable presumption, and significantly constrain the ability of the parties to bargain around them. See Goetz & Scott, The
Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAUF. L. REv. 261, 263 (1985). In such cases, the mandatory-default
distinction is one of degree and not of kind.
114. Most default rules specify terms which the majority of bargainers would have
agreed to. However, not all default rules seek to mimic the bargain which the parties would
have negotiated, and Ayres and Gertner have identified a class of penalty default terms to
which the bargainers would never have agreed. Penalty defaults increase the incentives of the
parties to cure the ambiguity, and will be imposed where it is more efficient for the bargainers
to specify the term than the courts. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ.87, 91-93 (1989).
115. Cf. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1451-55
(1986) (describing how screening explanations justify the mandatory nature of secured lending
rules).
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gain prices by telephoning stores or by reading advertisements than
by reviewing contract terms. 116 Terms which would be efficiently
specified if all consumers were to screen might then be abandoned
for terms which inefficiently favor the merchant. Thus, a term which
efficiently shifts a risk from consumers to merchants will be omitted
if no consumer will notice the omission.
The omission of the consumer warranty may not have distributional consequences. Where consumers screen prices but not terms,
the adoption of a low quality term will result in a price reduction,
and this will prevent merchants from transferring wealth to themselves by omitting the warranty." 7 Nevertheless, inefficiencies in the
specification of terms represent a welfare loss, and mandating terms
may serve efficiency goals.""
Screening theories may therefore explain why standard form
terms are subjected to a substantive fairness review. However, such
theories are unpersuasive unless courts are able to identify the set of
efficient terms more accurately than consumers. A review of cases
where contract terms have been set aside does not inspire great confidence in the ability of courts to rewrite contracts. Courts have set
aside exemption clauses," 9 security terms,' 20 and termination provi116. In the model of Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 104, at 655, markets may be competitive as to price and terms if as few as one-third of the consumers absorb screening costs for
each kind of screening. The costs of price screening are frequently low, particularly where
sellers advertise their prices, and price competition will be frequently obtained in mass markets. However, it is less likely that the requisite number of consumers will review the terms of
a lengthy standard form contract to ensure term competition. See Goldberg, Institutional
Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & ECON. 461, 485 (1974).
It is also unclear why consumers would screen for unfair terms. The hypothesis that
screening is costly is inconsistent with the assumption that both screening and non-screening
consumers are given the same set of terms. Cf. Grossman & Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393, 404 (1980) (stating that without
gains from trade with non-screeners, screeners would have no incentive to invest in costly information production). Screeners would not bear the costs of reading the document unless
there were a benefit in doing so, and the only possible benefit is better terms than those offered
to non-screeners.
117. See Goldberg, supra note 116, at 485-86; cf. Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 31-33 (1981)
(stating that on "defensive distributional" explanations of secured lending, all firms may issue
secured claims where a firm's secured debt ratio cannot be determined by its unsecured
claimholders).
118. This Article does not consider the merits of substitute strategies. Rather than mandating legal terms, inefficiencies in term specification might be addressed by efforts to reduce
the cost of term screening. These might include disclosure requirements which highlight terms
deemed oppressive as a condition of their enforceability.
119. See, e.g., Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank Co., [1970] 1 Q.B. 447
(C.A.) (holding that a fundamental breach brought the contract to an end, so that defendant
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issions 21 without evidencing any great understanding of economic 122
terms.
inefficient
mandated
likely
have
they
process,
sues. In the
Consumers may also have stronger screening skills than proponents of screening efficiencies suppose. An agreement may be efficient as to its terms even if not all consumers screen. Non-screening
consumers are adequately protected if some consumers screen and
the seller cannot term discriminate by offering one standard form
contract to screeners and another to non-screeners1 2 a This will permit non-screeners to free ride on the screening activities of more meticulous consumers. In addition, an increase in judicial screening will
come at the expense of a decline in consumer screening, since screening consumers have less reason to review contract terms when courts
are more ready to do so. The result would be a smaller number of
extremely unfair terms, but a greater number of slightly unfair ones.
This will not always benefit non-screening consumers.
In extreme cases, however, a substantive fairness review might
still be justified on screening theories. The review should be restricted to terms which cannot be said to serve efficiency purposes,
and which few or no consumers would have understood. Though
these are substantial hurdles, there is no reason to assume that they
can never be surmounted. Thus, a fairness review was warranted in
the old chestnuts of Thornborow v. Whitacre"24 and James v. Morgan.1 25 In Thornborow, the defendant borrowed £5 and in return
promised to give the plaintiff two grains of rye-corn in the first week,
four grains in the second, eight grains in the third, and so on for a
year.1 26 The defendant argued that if the promise were enforced,
manufacturer could not rely on limitation of liability clause).
120. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 194 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C.
1964) (impeaching a cross-collateral security clause).
121. See, e.g., Mister Broadloom Corp. (1968) Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, 44 O.R. (2d)
368 (1983) (holding that the debtor was entitled to a reasonable time to repay a payable-ondemand loan even when the debtor had made prohibited intercorporate loans).
122. See Epstein, supra note 1, at 305-15 (concluding that limitations of liability, addon clauses and termination provisions serve economic purposes, and that legal barriers to them
are unwarranted).
123. See supra note 116. What counts is screening in the aggregate and if most consumers screen, the contract should be enforced, even if the individual purchaser did not and could
not read it. See Thompson v. London, Midland & Scottish Ry., [1930] 1 K.B. 41 (C.A.)
(holding an illiterate plaintiff bound to an exemption clause incorporated by reference on a
ticket).
124. 92 Eng. Rep. 270 (1705).
125.

83 Eng. Rep. 323 (1664).

126. Thornborow, 92 Eng. Rep. at 270.
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there would not be enough grain in the world to satisfy it. 127 In
James, the defendant bought a horse in return for a barley-corn for
the horse's first nail, and doubling up for every nail until all thirtytwo nails were accounted for.1 28 The price came to over six tons of
barley.1 29 Both contracts were set aside, though in James the defendant was made to pay for the horse.13 0 Special terms as to the method
of payment may serve efficiency purposes, but clearly did not do so
in these cases. Moreover, the purchasers would have found it difficult
to understand what they were being asked to pay because of the deliberate obscurity of the provisions. Therefore, as a strategy of last
resort, a substantive fairness review might usefully reduce screening
costs.
B.

Price Screening

In screening theories, substantive fairness norms are most appropriate where screening costs are high. There is little justification
for a fairness review of prices in modern consumer markets, where
comparison shopping is relatively easy and where prices are readily
understood. Where prices cannot easily be compared, however, a
stronger case may be made for a fair price review. Just price theories
might thus have served efficiency goals at the time when the schoolmen propounded them.' 3 ' Medieval consumers in Aix would have
found it useful to know the price that like commodities traded for in
Ghent, but could not easily have found out for themselves. A just
price review of excessive prices might then have permitted consumers to economize on costly comparison shopping. 32
127. Id.
128. James 83 Eng. Rep. at 323.
129. Id.
130. Thornborrow, 92 Eng. Rep. at 271; James, 83 Eng. Rep. at 323.
131. Medieval scholars could not have had anything like a sophisticated understanding
of screening efficiencies. Moreover, there was no one theory of the just price, but a wide variety of explanations over a period of several hundred years. Nevertheless, prominent versions of
the just price theory were broadly consistent with screening theories. Thus, the just price was
one determined by the "common estimate" of bargainers, and this was frequently identified
with market price. See, e.g., J. NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYsis OF USURY 81-85 (1957);
de Roover, The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J. EcON. HIsT.
418, 420-21 (1958). In addition, it was a range of prices and not a fixed price, and only the
outliers were unjust. See J. NOONAN, supra, at 85-86. The doctrine would therefore have assisted bargainers who bought goods in one community ignorant of what they traded for in
nearby towns.
132. Once again, however, the benefits of judicial screening may not outweigh the costs
associated with the decline in information production by screening consumers. See supra note
122 and accompanying text (concluding that legal barriers imposed by judicial review reduce
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C. Waivers of the FairnessReview
Even if mandatory substantive fairness norms serve screening
efficiencies, it might be thought that consumers should be permitted
to waive the fairness review."' The possibility that a bargain will be
set aside for unfairness will impose costs upon sellers and increase
the price of the commodities. A purchaser might therefore prefer to
waive the fairness norms when the seller is reputable and the
probability of an unfair term may be discounted. If the waiver is
effective, rights to a fairness review will be merely presumptive, and
not mandatory.
At a minimum, a waiver will narrow the scope of the review,
since it attests to the limited benefit of fairness norms. However, it is
not difficult to imagine terms which would never be enforced in spite
of a prominently-displayed waiver. For example, contracts of slavery
are illegal,'3 and will never be enforced whatever the evidence as to
consent. But were such contracts enforceable, an unread provision as
to slavery buried in a standard form contract would surely not be
saved by a signature.13 5 The presumption of fairness is strong, but
never conclusive. As a consequence, waivers do not exclude the application of substantive fairness norms.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Substantive fairness norms which specify how bargaining gains
are to be divided are generally thought inefficient, and a relic of

scholastic philosophy. Where a substantive fairness review is defended, it is usually on distributional grounds. However, a better defense of judicial intervention may be made from the perspective of

incentive, cooperation and screening efficiencies.
Fairness and efficiency norms are commonly thought antithetical. This perception is not wholly inaccurate, for a concession to fairincentives to screen).
133. Express waivers are uncommon, but signing a contractual document is ordinarily
interpreted as a waiver. See L'Estrange v. F. Graucob, Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394, 403; Merit
Music Serv. v. Sonneborn, 245 Md. 213, 220, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (1967). The rule that the act
of signing the contract is to be taken as a waiver of fairness claims is merely a convention.
However, the convention is easily understandable and well understood by most bargainers.
Little would be gained if express waiver forms were effective in barring fairness claims, but
bare signatures were not.
134. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
135. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (explaining how in extreme cases it is
so difficult to establish consent that the costliness of procedural review warrants a substantive
prohibition).
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ness will often come at the expense of efficiency gains. However,
where fairness efficiencies obtain, it is misleading to think of one
norm being traded off against another. Instead, greater fairness may
be accompanied by greater wealth.
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